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At a time when different groups in society are achieving notable 
gains in respect and rights, activists in mental health and propo-
nents of mad positive approaches, such as Mad Pride, are coming 
up against considerable challenges. A particular issue is the com-
monly held view that madness is inherently disabling and cannot 
form the grounds for identity or culture. This paper responds to 
the challenge by developing two bulwarks against the tendency to 
assume too readily the view that madness is inherently disabling: 
the first arises from the normative nature of disability judgments, 
and the second arises from the implications of political activism in 
terms of being a social subject. In the process of arguing for these 
two bulwarks, the paper explores the basic structure of the social 
model of disability in the context of debates on naturalism and 
normativism, the applicability of the social model to madness, and 
the difference between physical and mental disabilities in terms of 
the unintelligibility often attributed to the latter.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For a number of decades, there have been considerable attempts to develop 
positive narratives of mental health phenomena, narratives that can counter-
act the pervasive, negative views in society and the profession of psychiatry.1 
The context in which these attempts were and are made is a burgeoning 
movement(s) of activism and advocacy in mental health. A recent chapter 
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in this activism is Mad Pride, a movement and discourse that pose a direct 
and radical challenge to the social norms and values underpinning views on 
“mental illness.”2 Mad Pride discourse rejects the language of “illness” and 
“disorder,” reclaims the term “mad,” and replaces its negative connotations 
with more positive understandings. It reverses the customary understand-
ing of madness as illness in favor of the view that madness can be grounds 
for identity and culture. In addition, Mad positive approaches and framings 
abound in the writings of activists: phenomena of madness such as states 
of heightened sensory awareness, visions and voices, and the ability to per-
ceive complexity and significance in everyday experiences are considered 
special and valuable, and not indicators of psychopathology. Their value 
is sometimes taken to arise from the creative, artistic, cultural, and spiritual 
potential afforded by these experiences.
Mad Pride discourse recognizes that madness can also be associated with 
distress and difficulties in social functioning. This Janus-faced nature of mad-
ness—at once a source of creativity and suffering—led to the formulation 
that individual traits and sensitivities are “dangerous gifts” that require cul-
tivation and care.3 Yet, it is the question of distress and disability that has 
proved to be a sticking point for Mad Pride discourse and for mad positive 
approaches in general: how can one advance a positive framing of that 
which appears to be inherently negative? This criticism has been expressed 
strongly by service users as well as academics. Clare Allan, an ex-patient 
who has written about her experiences with mental health services, argues 
that there is nothing about “mental illness” of which to be proud. Although 
she recognizes the stigma faced by mental health patients, she understands 
Mad Pride as essentially a tactic to bolster the self-esteem of service users 
who, for years, have been subjected to stigma and disrespect in society and 
degrading treatment by services; she writes:
Mental illness is not an identity. Nor is it something I wish to celebrate . . . Mental 
illness is ruthless, indiscriminate and destructive. It is also an illness. It is certainly 
not a weakness, but nor is it a sign of a special “artistic” sensitivity. It affected Van 
Gogh, as it does bus drivers, plumbers, teachers, older people and children. Winston 
Churchill was reportedly manic-depressive, if so, it’s a diagnosis he shares with my 
friend Cathy, a mother of two from Peckham. Mental illness is an illness, just as 
cancer is an illness; and people die from both. (Allan, 2006)
A similar criticism can be found in the academic literature. Jost (2009, 
2) writes that “mental illnesses” are not “different ways of processing infor-
mation or emotion; they are disorders in the capacities for processing infor-
mation or emotion.” It is absurd, she argues, to urge people to embrace 
such conditions and regard them positively. In making this point, Jost (2009, 
2) draws a distinction between conditions that are disabling because the 
physical and social environment fails to accommodate variations in traits and 
characteristics, and “mental illnesses” that are “inherently negative” and “will 
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always cause suffering” even if stigma and disadvantage were to be elimi-
nated. Perring (2009) writes that for some of those who object to the move-
ment, the analogy with Black Pride or Gay Pride—an analogy made in Mad 
Pride discourse—can only go so far as none of these are intrinsically disa-
bling features of a person while mental illnesses” tend to be seen as such. 
That is why, he notes, it would be equally bizarre to have a Cancer Pride 
movement. Such views, no doubt, have wide currency among many clini-
cians who see every day in the clinic the effects of “mental illness”: social 
and functional deterioration, loss of friends and family, and the distress of 
extreme mental states.
There is, therefore, a challenge facing Mad Pride discourse and mad 
positive approaches: the problem of distress and disability. In this paper, 
I respond to the problem of disability by developing two bulwarks against 
the tendency to adopt, too readily, the (medical) view that madness is inher-
ently disabling: (1) the normative basis of disability judgments; (2) the impli-
cations of political activism in terms of being a social subject. To delineate 
the scope of my argument, I begin with two disclaimers: first, my concern 
in this paper is disability and not distress. The former, on an initial reading, 
consists in limitations to/impairments of everyday functioning and participa-
tion. The latter—distress—concerns affective states such as fear, anxiety, or 
sadness. The two can be connected, of course; intense fear can impact on 
functioning, and disability can engender anxiety. This connection will be 
noted as required, but the two concepts raise different issues and require 
separate consideration.4 Second, my purpose is not to argue against the 
medical model of disability but against the tendency to assume it too readily 
in the case of madness. I begin by clarifying the criticism of Mad Pride and 
mad positive approaches.
II. CLARIFYING THE CRITICISM
The problem of disability, as it emerges through the aforementioned criti-
cisms of Mad Pride, can be more accurately stated as follows:
• “Mental illness” is associated with disability.
• This association is not contingent: disability is intrinsic to mental illness, 
which means that the various limitations experienced by individuals 
with those “conditions” are a result of the “conditions” and not an intol-
erant or unaccommodating society.
• By contrast, so the argument would go, the limitations experienced by 
gay individuals were/are a result of a homophobic society that denied 
them equal rights and the right to be themselves. Once we correct for 
social discrimination and oppression, the limitations that gay individu-
als face will reduce.
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In brief, the criticism can be formulated as follows: even in a utopian world 
where there is absolutely no discrimination and a surplus of well-meaning 
regard that people show toward each other, “mental illness” will still reduce 
the well-being of those afflicted.5 To be clear from the outset, this state-
ment cannot be intended as an empirical claim, not only because there are 
no studies of the fate of “mental illness” in utopia but because the proof 
demanded for this claim to work requires that the phenomena in question 
remain disabling for afflicted individuals once all socially discriminating and 
negative conditions have been removed. The problem here is that it will 
never be possible to assert that one has concluded the investigation, as it 
will not be possible to know if social conditions are the best they could 
be, assuming we can even agree on what “best” means. Given that it is not 
intended as an empirical claim, what exactly is the basis for it? To gain some 
further ground here, we can consider a possible response to this criticism, 
one that appears in the writings of some activists.
The response is to affirm that what is referred to as “mental illness” is a 
variation on human experiences and ways of being. The reason these vari-
ations may lead to problems in functioning has to do with a social world 
that is not set up to accommodate them and not due to a “disorder” or some 
intrinsic malfunction:
Most mental illnesses are seen as disorders because they prevent the person from 
functioning properly in the social world we have set up for ourselves . . . If the 
majority of the population was bipolar, things would be set up to accommodate 
them, and those without bipolar “symptoms” would struggle to fit in and understand 
the world. Is failure to hold up to the expectations of other people really a disorder? 
(Polvora, 2011, 4)
Both the criticism and the response to it purport to specify the locus of the 
problem: the former locates the cause of disability in the individual—in the 
“mental illness” to be precise—and the latter locates it in a society designed 
only to accommodate a particular norm. Essentially, then, the two posi-
tions here reflect a “medical” versus a “social” understanding of the limita-
tions associated with madness. To arbitrate between them, I visit the social 
model of disability, a framework that has been substantially worked out in 
Disability Theory and can help make sense of this dispute.
III. MODELS OF DISABILITY
According to standard definitions, disability is comprised of a physical or 
mental impairment associated with long-term limitations on the ability to 
perform daily activities.6 For example, blindness, according to this frame-
work, would be an impairment—or, for a less value-laden term, a variation 
in human functioning—that ordinarily would limit the person’s ability for 
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personal and social functioning and participation. The priority given either 
to impairment or to social context in generating limitations gave rise to a 
number of disability models, the most prominent of which are the medical 
and the social models. The medical (individual) model emphasizes variations 
as the primary cause of limitation and prescribes medical correction and/or 
financial compensation. The social model, endorsed in some form by many 
disability activists and theoreticians, emphasizes that limitations arise from a 
physical and social environment designed and conducted in such a way that 
excludes or does not take into account individuals with variations in traits 
or characteristics (Oliver, 1990, 1996).7 The social model shifts attention to 
restrictive and exclusionary conditions in society and prescribes various sorts 
of accommodations to address this. In the case of sensory impairments/vari-
ations, for example blindness, accommodations can include practical adjust-
ments such as tactile and audio signage.
It is important at this point to introduce some complexity into the notion 
of limitation in view of the kinds of actions involved. Nordenfelt (1997) 
distinguishes basic actions from generated actions. A basic action, such as 
moving a limb, is a simple and primary action that constitutes the first step 
in the chain that ends with complex, or generated, action (Nordenfelt, 1997, 
611). The latter are actions describable at the level of the person in terms of 
overarching goals such as “writing a book” or “making a chair.” To clarify 
the notion of basic action, it will help to see it not in predefined terms but 
as something that becomes apparent by its absence. In this way, we can 
avoid having to ground the notion in an account of species-typical natural 
functioning and can leave it open to individual variation. Further, the notion 
of basic “action” needs to be broadened to incorporate other aspects of 
our fundamental abilities that are not ordinarily thought of as actions. For 
example, a certain level of concentration is required to be able to focus on a 
task. Concentration, according to the account advanced here, is not a basic 
“action” but a basic “ability” that underpins much of what we do.
Ordinarily, we become aware of the basic nature of some of our abilities 
when we are thwarted in realizing our complex goals. Ideally, the body 
is the medium through which we project and realize our intentions in the 
world. It remains in the background as a transparent medium until, for some 
reason, its interference with our complex goals renders salient a particular 
aspect or function. It can be a painful limb, impaired concentration, poor 
vision, or a heightened state of anxiety. All of these can be considered within 
the scope of basic abilities in the sense that they are disruptions to the taken 
for granted background of our complex activity in the world and become 
salient when they hold us back.8 The point at which this occurs is as per-
sonal as it is cultural, and we need not for this view refer to an account of 
natural function.
On this basis, we can distinguish two levels of limitation. The first level 
consists in the basic inabilities (typified in disability models as impairments 
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or variations) that become salient when our complex activity in the world is 
disrupted. 9 The second level consists in the disruptions to the complex activ-
ity itself: the inability to work, socialize, or go to the market. Now, though an 
impairment constitutes a limitation at the basic level—a blind person cannot 
see, a broken limb cannot bear weight—it is not by itself sufficient for limita-
tions at the level of complex activity. Complex actions are always performed 
in some physical and social environment, and the extent to which we can 
realize our goals depends, in part, on the match between the environment 
and our (in)abilities (see Amundson, 1992, 109–10).10 So, though a blind 
person may be unable to see (a limitation at the level of basic abilities), his 
inability to realize employment (a limitation at the level of complex action) 
can be addressed through specially designed working quarters that take into 
account his specific sensory abilities. Of course, one may wish to correct for 
the basic inability (the impairment)—to correct for loss of vision or hearing 
for example—but where that is not possible (technologically) or desired 
(e.g., Deaf Pride), then the variation/environment interaction can be scruti-
nized for impediments to the realization of specific complex goals.
Another helpful way to cash out the distinction between these two levels 
of limitation is in terms of the extent to which disadvantages are conditional 
on/produced by the social context. Amundson and Tresky (2007, 544) define 
the terms as follows:
Conditional Disadvantages of Impairment (CDIs): Disadvantages that are experi-
enced by people with impairments, but which are produced by the social context 
in which those people live.
Unconditional Disadvantages of Impairment (UDIs): Disadvantages that are expe-
rienced by people with impairments, but which are produced irrespective of their 
social context.
Mapped onto the two levels of limitations specified earlier, basic inabilities 
would be unconditional whereas disruptions to complex activities would be 
conditional. Although I see a place for the distinction as such, I would not 
put it this strongly, as the notion of an absolutely unconditional disadvantage 
does not work. As I argued previously, a basic inability is made salient in 
the context of failing to achieve a complex action. The latter itself is relative 
to physical and social environmental contexts and hence is, in part, condi-
tional upon them. So, it is more accurate to see this distinction as a matter of 
degree and not kind: as a distinction concerning the proximity of a particular 
description of disadvantage to one’s physical and mental states as opposed 
to the environment in which one is pursuing goals.11
The importance of the distinction between conditional and unconditional 
disadvantages is that it serves to limit the “oversocialisation” of the radical 
form of the social model of disability, which appears to deny a role for impair-
ment in generating disadvantage (Terzi, 2004, 153). With this distinction in 
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place, it becomes possible to argue, for example, that while a deaf person 
may be unable to hear and may not be able to listen to music, these particu-
lar “limitations” flow from the impairment/variation and are separate from 
the restrictions he or she may face in finding employment or watching the 
news when no alternative form of communication, such as sign language, is 
made available.12 The former are basic inabilities—whether or not they are 
undesirable—and the latter are the limitations caused by an unaccommodat-
ing social environment. As Amundson and Tresky (2007, 544) note, in dis-
ability rights discourse unconditional disadvantages “are taken as brute facts 
of human variation” and are not considered within the scope of disability 
claims and campaigning. Similarly, the social model—writes Oliver (2004, 
22), the person credited with its introduction—“is not about the personal 
experience of impairment but the collective experience of disablement.”
Having made this distinction, it is important to note that there is no hard 
and fast way of drawing the line between unconditional and conditional 
disadvantages. The distinction is worked out in practice, leaning heavily on 
disabled peoples’ experiences and on what exactly the demand for social 
accommodation is about in the context of wider debates on these issues (see 
Amundson and Tresky, 2007, 553). Yet, the problem with the medical model 
of disability, and with the criticisms of Mad Pride described earlier, is that 
this distinction—if it is made at all—appears to lean too heavily on one side, 
with all or most limitations considered to arise from the impairment/varia-
tion. Such medical models conflate the two levels of limitation discerned 
earlier or recognize them as distinct but put too much emphasis on basic 
inabilities over disruption to complex activity. The area of contention then 
lies precisely at the boundary where what is put forward by disability rights 
activists as a conditional disadvantage is seen by advocates of the medical 
model as an unconditional disadvantage flowing from, or intrinsic to, the 
impairment itself. It is the latter, medical view that I consider problematic 
and to which I now turn.
IV. NATURALISM, NORMATIVISM, AND DISABILITY
Critics of the medical model of disability have argued that the claim that limi-
tations are “caused” by the impairment—that, say, not being able to access 
information is caused by a person’s sensory impairments—presupposes a 
naturalistic view of function (Amundson, 2000). Naturalism is the view that 
norms of physical and mental functioning can be objectively determined. 
Two well-known naturalist accounts have been put forth by Christopher 
Boorse and Jerome Wakefield. For Boorse (1997), a normal function of a part 
or process of an individual is a statistically typical contribution by it to the 
individual’s survival and reproduction. Statistically normal function is deter-
mined relative to the individual’s reference class, which is the appropriate 
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segment of the species as defined by age and sex.13 For Wakefield (1992, 
384), the natural function of a mechanism is the function for which it has 
been designed (selected) in evolution; it is “part of the evolutionary explan-
ation of the existence and structure of the mechanism.” For example, the 
heart pumps blood, the legs move our body, and the visual system conveys 
perceptual information about the world: these are natural functions of the 
respective organs; they are what the organs were designed to do.
On the basis of their accounts of natural function, Boorse and Wakefield 
can then purport to specify physical or mental dysfunction in value-free 
terms as deviation from natural function. Both also recognize that that is 
not sufficient by itself to delineate the conditions that should be treated. For 
Boorse (2011, 28) and Wakefield (1992), a further evaluative component is 
required, which consists in the evaluation of this dysfunction as harmful 
in light of personal, social, and medical norms and values. On Wakefield’s 
formulation, disorder becomes a harmful dysfunction or—which amounts 
to the same thing for our purposes here—a harmful impairment. With this 
kind of reasoning, a blind person would have a dysfunction/impairment in 
the visual apparatus that, if associated with harm, would qualify the condi-
tion as a disorder. And given that according to naturalistic accounts function 
is a matter of objectively determined natural facts—with dysfunction being 
a deviation from normal function—then the limitation, the harm, that may 
arise from this is referred back to the dysfunction and not to a deficiency in 
the design of the physical and social environments relative to the functional 
abilities of different persons. This is because the person with a dysfunction, 
on this view, lies outside the range of normal functional abilities, and he or 
she lies outside this range not due to some inconsiderate value judgment but 
by the facts of human nature.
The problem with naturalistic theories, and therefore with the foregoing 
argument, is that attempts to define dysfunction in value-free terms have not 
been successful. This debate has been well rehearsed by several philoso-
phers and I will only state their conclusions.14
Since its inception, Boorse’s theory has been subject to a lively interchange 
and many objections. Of particular relevance here are accusations of implicit 
normativism in both the notion of statistically normal function and the ref-
erence class against which this is to be assessed. With regard to the former, 
Bolton (2008, 113) points out that statistical (ab)normality does not by itself 
tell us at what point on a continuous distribution curve “deviance from the 
mean become(s) subnormal function.” Factors that in fact do underlie this 
judgment are those associated with the value component: harm and func-
tional limitations as judged by personal and, more broadly, social values and 
norms. As a principle purporting to provide a factual basis for discerning 
normal from subnormal function, statistical normality does not work. With 
regard to reference classes, Kingma (2007, 2013) argues that Boorse’s account 
requires that he specify the reference classes appropriate to an assessment of 
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health. Otherwise, any condition can be rendered healthy if we devise a ref-
erence class that shows it in a good light. For example, if we were to allow 
for a reference class of “uncommonly heavy drinkers,” then liver functions 
that would otherwise be considered abnormal would no longer be so, and 
those heavy drinkers, according to Boorse’s account, would be considered 
healthy (Kingma, 2007, 128). Boorse, therefore, needs to provide an account 
of the appropriate reference classes, and he needs to do so in a value-free, 
noncircular way, i.e., without introducing values into what is supposed to 
be a fact-based definition of normal function, and without presupposing the 
distinction he is trying to prove between health and disease (Kingma, 2007). 
As Kingma (2007, 2013) argues, Boorse’s account cannot provide this.
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder has also met with 
serious objections. Dysfunction, as noted earlier, is deviation from the nat-
ural function of a mechanism: the function that explains, in evolutionary 
terms, the mechanism’s existence and design. For our purposes here, the 
most relevant objection to Wakefield’s analysis of dysfunction is that which 
questions its presumed factual basis. For Wakefield, the norms underpin-
ning natural function are natural (evolutionary) norms to be contrasted 
with social (cultivated) norms (Bolton, 2008, 124). The former underpin the 
objective status of dysfunction and the latter feature in the harm compo-
nent. According to Bolton (2013), it is no longer possible to maintain a clear 
distinction between what is natural/innate and what is social/cultivated. It 
is now generally accepted that psychological functions are a product of 
an interaction between several factors: socialisation processes and genetic 
inheritance, complicated by individual differences and choice (Bolton, 2013, 
442–3). These factors are not separable through the science we currently 
possess (Bolton, 2013, 442–3). Yet without a clear distinction, Wakefield’s 
account cannot tag exclusively onto a fact of our evolutionary nature in its 
bid to provide a value-free account of dysfunction.
If we accept the criticisms of these two leading naturalist theories, we can 
conclude that it has not proven possible to define function and dysfunction 
in value-free terms. We may accept this conclusion yet continue the search 
for a value-free, theoretical concept of function. An alternative position is to 
take seriously the value-ladenness of the relevant concepts and see where 
this may lead us. It will lead us to various forms of normativism about func-
tion. Here, descriptions of normal function are made in terms of what is 
good or bad, desirable or undesirable for an agent in the context of spe-
cific life situations and environments, in the present or a projected future. 
Those descriptions, though not pretending to have an objective standpoint 
in nature, are not any less “real” than naturalistic accounts: the core values 
that inform our lives, the projects we engage in, and the futures we plan are 
very serious matters. Indeed, it is a reflection of their seriousness that we 
tend to refer to those aspects of our abilities that may prevents us from pur-
suing them as “diseases” or “disorders.” But, the apparent objectivity of these 
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terms should not obscure that they signal a normative and not a natural limit; 
they signal the limit of what a person and/or society considers normal, valu-
able, or good. These notions are set against a background of abilities that are 
considered the norm, in the sense of being the taken for granted foundations 
of a particular way of life in a particular social and physical environment. 
This has implications on how we can talk about disability.
It will help at this point to recall the problem that led us here. It was borne 
out of the need to arbitrate between the medical and social views on the 
origin of the limitations associated with variations in function. Advocates of 
the medical model consider most of the limitations to be unconditional, i.e., 
intrinsic to the dysfunction/impairment/variation itself. Given the prior anal-
ysis, we have a different way of understanding this claim. When we witness 
a person struggling to achieve some complex goal, we may refer this back 
to some dysfunction in his or her abilities. Now, we can see that the limit 
drawn by our reference to dysfunction is a normative and not a natural limit. 
Hence, when we say that a dysfunction (or an impairment or variation) is 
intrinsically disabling, we need also to give an account of the norms, values, 
and contexts by which we were driven to make this claim, and to come to 
terms with that being the basis of our judgment. The importance of remain-
ing cognizant of this point is that in its absence we would not even occasion 
the need to perhaps examine those norms, values, and contexts and see if 
they can be modified in such a way that would reflect positively on that per-
son’s ability to function and thrive in society through various sorts of adjust-
ments. This would act as a bulwark against the gratuitous individualization 
of the difficulties others face, and the powerful tendency to medicalize their 
predicament instead of coming to terms with the social solutions that can 
be put in place, bearing in mind that that is what the activists are asking for.
Before proceeding, a final clarification: this argument for a normative 
reading of disability judgments does not entail that we must in each case 
employ the social model, evidently not; in many cases addressing limitations 
through medical correction or, more generally, intervention at the personal 
level will be recommended. What it does mean, however, is that the judg-
ment as to whether we should intervene at the individual or social level 
cannot be made through recourse to some account of natural function and 
dysfunction, but by pragmatic as well as ethical factors including considera-
tions of efficiency, safety, equality, and justice to name a few.
V. APPLYING THE SOCIAL MODEL TO MADNESS
Having established the normative nature of disability judgments and having 
developed the first bulwark against the tendency to view certain variations/
impairments in functioning as inherently disabling, it remains to be seen just 
how the social model can be applied to madness. In the ensuing discussion, 
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note that the concern is with conditions that are long-lasting, have a sub-
stantial effect on daily activity, and where treatment is either not desired or 
not possible, i.e., we are concerned with “disabilities” and not acute or self-
limiting problems.
Applying the social model to madness is not new; activists and academics 
have written about the potential and the problems of doing so. The disabil-
ity movement has achieved some progress in making salient the contribu-
tions of the physical and social environments to generating limitations, with 
many accommodations to address this now enshrined in law. Developing 
a social model of madness in keeping with the social model of disability is 
seen as a way of counteracting the “medicalized individual approach” that 
is dominant in society and mental health institutions (Beresford, 2005; see 
also Mulvany, 2000). Resistance to this proposal has come from both sides. 
Some psychiatric survivors/service users refuse to be associated with disabil-
ity discourse, as they do not consider themselves to have an impairment, nor 
do they want to be associated with the “pathologising” implications of the 
term “impairment” (see Beresford, 2000; Beresford et al., 2010). Conversely, 
others actively endorse the term disability as it creates a sense of community 
across the survivor/service user/mad and disability movements (Price, 2013). 
Yet, others are reluctant to use “disability” for the fear of being accused 
that they are not disabled enough; that they do not have the appropriate 
life-long impairments (Spandler and Anderson, 2015, 24). The reluctance of 
some within the Mad movement to accept the social model of disability and 
adopt its terminology has been interpreted by a physically disabled activ-
ist as reflecting the “disablism” prevalent within sections of this movement 
(Withers, 2014). That is, in refusing to be referred to as disabled and in 
asserting that unlike disabled people they have no tangible, “real” impair-
ment, these activists are contributing to the idea that disability is a fixed thing 
and not an outcome of the interaction between individual capacities and 
specific social/physical contexts. Fear of increased stigma is another stum-
bling block for a shared discourse and activities between the disability and 
the Mad movements. Each group faces its own distinctive stigma in society, 
and to take on the term “madness” or the term “disability” is to take on an 
extra challenge (Withers, 2014).
Although these are important issues, the key point for the argument here 
is the underlying framework and not the terminology in place: what is of 
essence in the medical/social model framework is an account of the inter-
action between the individual and society in relation to the production of 
limitations on everyday activity. With regard to naming, one may eschew 
the problematic term “impairment” for the less-loaded one “variation,” and 
one need not use the word “disability” at all. On the question of what con-
stitutes a mental variation we don’t need to assume some account of natural 
function by which mental functions (and variations thereof) can be speci-
fied—the idea of natural function has already been problematised.15 Given 
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the argument presented earlier, a relevant mental variation is one that is 
made salient when our complex activity in the world is disrupted. It would 
not be “schizophrenia” or “psychosis,” but the features that typically underlie 
these diagnoses such as voices, paranoid beliefs, anxious feelings, difficul-
ties understanding social behavior, mood fluctuations, impaired attention 
and concentration, and others. These features can impose a range of limita-
tions on the ability of individuals to realize their goals and to participate in 
everyday social situations and interactions. A few examples will illustrate:
• A person who experiences chronic anxiety (or paranoia) finds it dif-
ficult to negotiate the long, crowded, bright lanes of the local mall and 
heads home without shopping. We can look at this disruption to activity 
from two vantage points: as a problem with the world or as a problem 
with one’s mental state (anxiety). Wherever we start, the other vantage 
point is implied: the difficulty of negotiating the mall makes salient 
my anxious feelings; my anxious feelings make salient the difficulty of 
negotiating the mall.
• A person hears voices and converses with them, as she finds this help-
ful and affords her a measure of control. When she does this in public 
people give her strange looks and sometimes walk away from her. Due 
to this, on many days she feels unable to leave the house and her social 
isolation is increasing. Here, as with the previous example, the disrup-
tion to activity (social isolation) can be seen as a consequence of one’s 
behavior or due to negative social responses, with each view made 
salient by the other.
• A person experiences fluctuations in mood; when “high” he can work 
for many hours on end, frequently overnight. Such episodes are fol-
lowed by several days of rest during which he feels tired and low in 
mood. Due to this, he is unable to keep consistent employment as his 
line of work cannot accommodate the requirement for erratic working 
hours. In this case, disruption to activity (employment) can be seen as 
a consequence of his mood fluctuations or due to unaccommodating 
working arrangements.
In each case, once a specific mental variation is identified, it becomes possi-
ble to reflect on the variation/environment mismatch and to formulate more 
precisely what exactly needs to change: modify the mental state/behavior, 
alter the environment, or some combination of the two.
The issues are different when the variation in question consists in a strongly 
held, nonconsensual belief: a “delusion.” For the sake of exposition consider 
two paradigmatic examples: the belief that one is persecuted by certain 
agents (persecutory delusion) and the belief that one’s spouse has been 
replaced by an impostor (Capgras delusion). On the basis of such beliefs, 
the person holding them may, respectively, barricade himself at home or 
avoid the spouse.16 For an outside observer who can see that both beliefs 
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are false, those individuals are subjecting themselves to unnecessary limita-
tions; they are disabled by their beliefs. But for the believers themselves, this 
insight would not arise as long as they continue to hold the requisite belief 
with conviction.17 For them, the problems they experience are facts about 
the world—that one is unsafe and that one’s spouse is an impostor—and not 
the beliefs per se. In terms of the basic idea underlying the social model, as 
argued in Section IV, what is made salient by what appears to be disruption 
to daily activity is not one’s mental state, but facts about the social world. If 
I refuse to leave the house because someone is waiting outside for me with 
a gun, I am not disabled; I am sensible. If I am convinced that I am under 
threat despite there being no threat, then others may consider me disabled 
by my belief, but I would not. In this specific respect, “delusional” beliefs 
are outside the scope of the social model. They are brought back within it, 
however, in a different manner.
The “delusional” person may experience limitations of a different sort. 
He or she may experience discrimination, disqualification, and ridicule for 
the very fact of holding the belief(s) in question. In this respect, the dis-
crimination in question would be no different to that which some religious 
minorities or sects face, except in relation to the question of numbers; the 
delusional person goes it alone, whereas sects tend to have a larger follow-
ing. Here, we are brought back within the scope of the social model, as 
I am prevented from accessing the same rights and respect as other citizens 
due to the beliefs that I hold. A remedy could be to change the belief or, 
alternatively, to change the social environment by making it more accepting 
and tolerant.18
The earlier examples show that even though the issues are complex and 
will require conceptual work and ingenuity, it is possible to apply social 
model thinking to at least some mental variations and related behaviors. 
In fact, this approach to mental variations has made its way to a number 
of publications by academics, policy makers, and charities in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere.19 These publications have issued recommendations 
on reasonable adjustments in the work place for people with “mental dis-
abilities.” Underlying this is the understanding that by contrast to physical 
impairments, mental variations tend to be less visible, have a more sig-
nificant impact on the social rather than the built environment, and hence 
will require adjustments that focus on social interactions and relationships 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2009). Among the recommendations: 
time-out if one feels anxious or paranoid, flexible hours, reduced workload, 
quieter workspace, private rather than open-plan working arrangements, 
availability of contact with a support worker or friend if someone feels par-
ticularly paranoid, working conditions matched to a person’s tolerance for 
contact with large numbers of people, and combating stigma among col-
leagues at work. The mental health charity Rethink Mental Illness (2012, 
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9) goes further, stating that stigma and negative attitudes of colleagues “can 
undermine adjustments that would otherwise be effective.”
Rethink is exactly right to point toward stigma as a major issue: without 
some significant change in how people think about madness/mental health 
problems, any proposed adjustments will be superficial and of limited effec-
tiveness. Further, stigma and negative perceptions may impact on individu-
als’ self-esteem and psychological and emotional well-being, thus creating 
further barriers to participation.20 Yet in pushing to alter such attitudes, the 
Department for Work and Pensions (2009) and Rethink Mental Illness (2012) 
advance or support the line of thought that mental health problems are ill-
nesses akin to physical illnesses, in the sense that they occur for reasons 
outside a person’s control (which arguably reduces blame), can be treated, 
are not to be feared, and are not a sign of weakness. However, as an anti-
stigma strategy, this is problematic on two counts: first, studies have shown 
that the argument that “mental illness is an illness like any other” does not 
reduce stigma, in fact it is associated with perceptions of unpredictability, 
dangerousness, and fear (Read et al. 2006); second, this argument is anti-
thetical to the demand for recognition of madness as an identity, where con-
cerned groups do not see themselves as ill and where aspects of madness 
are reformulated in a positive light or, at least, neutrally. Rethink is correct in 
pointing out that negative attitudes can genuinely hamper a person’s ability 
to partake in the work environment; the difficult question is to specify what 
lies at the root of the problem in society at large.
To put this differently, impaired concentration, anxiety, paranoia, and 
social withdrawal are experiences that are commonplace enough not to 
generate any severe or unique discrimination from others. Most people are 
familiar with these experiences—think of sleep deprivation, jet lag, or a bad 
hangover—and readily find excuses for each other for them and, if they 
are generous, accommodate each other for them. What generates particu-
lar challenges in the case of madness is precisely the association of such 
experiences with phenomena that generate fear and distrust in others. To be 
anxious or paranoid due to the effects of alcohol overuse is not the same as 
having those experiences due to hearing voices or harboring fears that one 
is persecuted by government agencies or by invisible beings. The latter are 
phenomena that, for most people, defy simple, if any, meaningful explana-
tion and from there engender a certain kind of disqualification and possibly 
distrust grounded in the apparent unintelligibility of these phenomena. At 
the point where this occurs, it is hard to sustain a social interaction in which 
the unique variations and traits of a person are noted and respected in order 
to create for him or her a more accommodating environment. More likely 
than not, when unintelligibility sets in we move from a position of accom-
modation to one of seeing the person before us as the main cause of their 
struggles. Intelligibility, therefore, is an important idea and merits a further 
look.
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VI. INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL ACCOMMODATION
There is no doubt that the variations discussed in Section V differ in sig-
nificant respects when compared with mobility and sensory variations in 
relation to the question of social accommodation. One difference, noted by 
Pilgrim and Tomasini (2012, 634), is that at the heart of the social reaction to 
“mental health problems” is an “attributed loss or lack of reason.” By contrast, 
with mobility and sensory variations (physical disability more broadly), that 
capacity is not at stake. Assumed lack of reason, they continue, underpins 
the disadvantage and discrimination that characterize the social response to 
madness; it underpins fear and distrust as well as paternalistic limitations of 
autonomy. Unreason here is used quite broadly and ranges from not being 
able to meet social obligations (due to anxiety or depression) to failures in 
intelligibility exemplified by individuals whose behavior is underpinned by 
voices, bizarre delusions, thought disorder, or other states that for some may 
resist everyday understanding.21 Intelligibility emerges as a helpful concept 
in marking out more precisely an important, if not central, factor that deter-
mines the limits of social accommodation of difference: the point at which 
we cease to consider discourses of social adjustment in favor of those that 
describe, in various ways, some sort of failure in the individual, for example, 
that he or she is “mentally ill.”
Consider the experience of hearing voices and its impact on behavior. 
A “voice-hearer” (Woods, 2013) may at times converse with the voices and 
be distracted by them. In some social contexts, as indicated earlier, behaving 
in this way can generate negative responses from others that may lead the 
voice-hearer into isolation and fears of appearing in public. In this example, 
developing social narratives in which voice hearing is normalized or marked 
out as a unique experience can engender a measure of intelligibility and 
tolerance of the associated behaviors, and this in turn may improve social 
inclusion for the voice-hearer. As Spandler and Anderson (2015, 19) note, 
this is what the Hearing Voices Movement has been seeking to do: to affect 
a shift from the view of voices as symptoms of illness to that of voices as 
meaningful phenomena. Intelligibility will depend on the kind of narra-
tive put forward to create this meaningfulness. Some narratives draw con-
nections between voice hearing, spirituality, and nonhuman agents such as 
spirits. Others see voices as denoting aspects of self and hence as offering a 
means for a more profound understanding of one’s past and identity.
For the voice-hearer’s interlocutor, intelligibility will depend on the extent 
to which he or she is able to accept the assumptions supporting the dif-
ferent narratives. And, herein lies the challenge of expanding our limits of 
the social accommodation of difference and our ability to conceive social 
adjustments: madness asks us to question our total worldview; to question 
our beliefs, values, sense of self, ideas of rationality, and personhood.22 The 
change required here is not to install a ramp or an alternate sign, it is to 
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change notions fundamental to us as persons and to broaden the idea of 
what is possible. This is most evident in cross-cultural encounters. Consider, 
for example, a person who barricades himself at home on hearing the voice 
of a spirit threatening him with death if he leaves his house. Whether we 
consider this an “illness”—after all it appears to be a paradigmatic example 
of “action failure”—or a genuine threat, will depend on the extent to which 
we take the cause of the obstruction as real.23 In cultural contexts where 
spirits are considered to exist and to have a say in human affairs, that per-
son’s self-imposed incarceration may appear to others as a sensible course 
of action until the spirit is dealt with. In cultural contexts where the “spirit” 
is understood as alienated mental content—objectified aspects of self—that 
person may be considered “ill. ”
While we are on the theme of cross-cultural encounters, we can consider 
other phenomena that appear to really defy intelligibility across cultural con-
texts. Such phenomena, thought disorder, for example, do not enjoy the “col-
lective reasonableness” and positive reframing achieved by, say, the Hearing 
Voices Movement (Pilgrim and Tomasini, 2012, 642; Spandler and Anderson, 
2015, 18–9). Jones and Kelly (2015, 47), mental health activists and academics, 
assert that “the struggles of a distressed individual who can nevertheless com-
municate with others, can and must be distinguished from an individual with 
thought disorder so severe that he or she can no longer be understood, even 
in the most basic of ways.” For Jones and Kelly, the limit of intelligibility is 
thought disorder, which is the limit it would appear of thought itself. For other 
less accommodating individuals, the limit lies much earlier, being evident for 
them in the slightest eccentricity in belief or behavior. The limit of intelligibility 
lies at different places for different people and, as indicated previously, marks 
out the point at which we begin to consider the limitations experienced by an 
individual to flow from the variation itself. At this point, we cease to consider 
changing social behavior in favor of changing the individual.
There are two bulwarks against this move or, at least, against assuming it 
too readily. The first has already been mentioned earlier and concerns the 
need to specify the values and standards by which one was driven to regard a 
particular variation as intrinsically disabling. In doing so, one may give more 
thought to the possibility of changing those standards in a way that would per-
mit a broader accommodation of difference. The second bulwark arises from 
political activism: from the very demand for social justice raised by activists.
VII. POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE SOCIAL SUBJECT
Mad Pride activists demand change in the social beliefs, norms, values, and 
overall practices that define madness/mental illness—essentially society’s total 
understanding and treatment of these “conditions.” The expectation is for soci-
ety to change to accommodate a unique identity or culture. Hence, a major 
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site of change is the reductive, discriminatory, and disrespectful language that 
dominates public and professional narratives, a language in which key terms 
all indicate deficit and pathology: disease, illness, disorder, delusion, halluci-
nation, and, of course, “madness” itself before its reclamation by activists. In 
this respect, Mad Pride’s demands lie on a par with demands for recognition 
long voiced by the more familiar collective identities constructed around race, 
gender, and sexuality. Indeed, as indicated at the outset, the analogy with Gay 
and Black rights is central to the discourse and is frequently pointed out. In 
urging cultural change, the demands of Mad Pride go beyond the equalization 
of civil rights irrespective of difference (which requires a politics of equality that 
rejects discrimination on the basis of morally irrelevant features) but, rather, the 
recognition of that difference as a matter of social justice: the distinctness of the 
identity in question, its claim to respect and equality.
The demand that society should change to accommodate a broader 
range of variations as a matter of justice implies that the person making this 
demand is a social subject. What is meant by “social subject” will shortly 
become apparent, but as an approximation it can be taken to mean a human 
being who sees oneself and sees others as engaged in a shared project in 
which each individual’s well-being is at stake and equally matters. Now at 
first sight, this claim may appear paradoxical, for a popular view in both lay 
and scholarly accounts is that a central aspect of madness (or of “schizophre-
nia”) is the dis-sociality of the subject; a sign of mad subjects’ madness is 
their withdrawal from society. For example, a person with severe paranoia 
may have a radical, sometimes global, loss of interpersonal trust; for that per-
son, others appear not as co-participants in a shared project but as a threat 
to one’s existence. In a related manner, the phenomenological psychopa-
thology literature describes the “schizophrenic” person as having a crisis of 
intersubjectivity; a disruption to the two fundamental poles of social reality: 
sensus communis and attunement.24 Other times the “schizophrenic” person 
is described as having a disorder of consciousness and self-awareness; an 
ipseity disturbance characterized by hyperreflexivity and diminished self-
affection (this view also concerns the “schizophrenic” person’s dis-sociality 
but starts from subjectivity rather than intersubjectivity).25 These accounts 
may seem to invalidate the idea that the “schizophrenic” person can be a 
social subject in the sense described earlier. If one accepts this conclusion, 
how do we make sense of those making the demand for social justice? One 
(cynical) approach is to claim that Mad Pride activists are not really mad at 
all. Another approach is to argue that the issue here is a matter of scope: the 
phenomena referred to by phenomenological psychopathology are at the 
far-end of the spectrum of sociality and are not representative of all “schizo-
phrenic,” “psychotic” or mad experiences.26 I reject the first approach and 
accept a qualified version of the second, as will be evident in what follows. 
But first, I return to the idea of the social subject implied by the demands 
of activists.
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Implied by the demand for the accommodation of a broader range of vari-
ations as a matter of justice are, at least, the following:
• An understanding of oneself as an individual among others.
• An understanding that individuals are different in some respects from 
each other, i.e., human diversity.
• An understanding that individual well-being depends, in part, on the 
sustenance provided by social interactions and arrangements.
• The ability to see oneself as part of a smaller group that is part of wider 
society.
• An understanding of oneself as a person who possesses rights and 
whose claims merit recognition.
• An understanding that others too possess rights (this is already implied 
by the way in which the demand is couched in the language of justice 
and fairness).
In short, what is implied by the demand is a view on social justice and an 
understanding of society. Returning to the limits of intelligibility discussed in 
Section VI, we can say that by virtue of making this demand—notwithstand-
ing the unintelligibility of specific experiences or behaviors—the person 
should be seen as a candidate for the social accommodation of difference 
rather than the medical (individual) correction (treatment) of behavior; the 
demand should act as a bulwark against the prioritization of an individual 
approach. The reason this is so is that the demand trumps the objection 
against social accommodation. In the terms raised here, this objection can be 
put as follows: mad individuals are, as it were, outside society, and to argue 
for accommodating their behaviors and mental variations is to risk losing 
society altogether, grounded as it is in shared rules and assumptions. The 
political demand demonstrates the person’s sociality and appreciation of the 
shared meta-project that is society, and hence refutes this objection.
Returning to the point I made earlier concerning the scope of sociality, 
it is true that some mad (or “schizophrenic”) experiences appear incompat-
ible with sociality, a point made in phenomenological psychopathology. 
However, I see those whom phenomenological psychopathology describes 
as suffering with a crisis in intersubjectivity to be those subjects who are yet 
to see their situation in terms of identity, diversity, and social justice; who are 
yet to be brought to a conception of themselves as social subjects. Here, the 
principle of consciousness-raising that is described in the activist literature is 
instructive. This is the process by which people get together, share stories, 
see similarities in their situations, and interpret their predicaments as aris-
ing from discriminatory and difficult social conditions rather than individual 
pathology. Once this is achieved, a demand is made to change those condi-
tions. Given this, an actual key goal within activist communities is to support 
individuals such that they are able to make that demand. In this endeavor, 
creating “collective reasonableness” in relation to particular phenomena is 
Page 18 of 25 Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jm
p/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jm
p/jhy016/5077410 by guest on 16 O
ctober 2018
also crucial. It may not be possible for some individuals to make the demand 
despite such support, and for others they may not wish to make it, opting 
instead for a more individual, illness-based discourse and intervention. But 
by redescribing the problem of sociality as a problem to be partly worked 
out in activism and political action, we are able to erect a bulwark against 
the tendency to see it in terms of disorder and individual pathology.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Along the decades, different groups have campaigned and struggled for 
respect and rights; some have been successful at achieving symbolic and 
cultural reparation, others less so. The enlarged scope of Gay rights in parts 
of North Europe, North America, and a few select other regions is usually 
cited as a success story. It is now pointed out that societies need to come to 
terms with the rights of transgender individuals and the respect they may be 
owed. Yet, Mad individuals, and madness more broadly, are yet to feature in 
the conversation on respect and identity, a conversation still dominated by 
framings that emphasize the medical idiom and the notions of distress and 
disability. This paper sought to address the problem of disability by erect-
ing two bulwarks against the tendency to assume, too readily, a medical 
interpretation of the limitations experienced by individuals with the kind of 
variations in mental function that fall under the umbrella term “madness.”
The first bulwark arose from an analysis of the disability model that 
revealed the normative basis of disability judgments: when we say that a 
variation (or impairment) is intrinsically disabling we need to accompany 
this judgment with an account of the values, norms, abilities, and contexts 
that underpin it. This requirement, though it may appear too subtle to make 
a difference, actually brings about a profound change in perspective: instead 
of seeing the limit of our ability to understand and accommodate difference 
as an indication of a (natural) problem with the difference itself, we come 
to view it as a normative limit constituted by values, norms, and abilities 
that go so deep they appear natural. With this insight in place, it becomes 
possible to resist medicalizing difference, and reflect on what possible social 
solutions can be put in place to accommodate it.
The second bulwark arose from reflection on the implications of political 
activism. To demand, as a matter of social justice, that society changes to 
accommodate a broader range of variations in function is to be a social sub-
ject; it is to be a candidate for the accommodation of difference rather than 
the individual (medical) correction of behavior.
There is no question that effecting the recommended change in perspec-
tive is a challenging endeavor. Although applying social model thinking 
to mental variations (to madness) is possible—as I have demonstrated—it 
raises issues different from the kind of variations in physical function for 
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which the social model of disability was initially developed. A key difference 
is the way in which madness presents a challenge of intelligibility; it asks us 
to question and broaden our values and beliefs with respect to fundamental 
notions such as our sense of self and overall worldview. Difficult though as 
that may be, at least we can now come to view this (apparently) insurmount-
able difference for what it is: as a radical challenge to norms and concepts 
constitutive of who we are. Whether we should attempt, as a matter of moral 
obligation, to change these norms and concepts in order to accommodate 
a broader range of experiences and behaviors is a further question to be 
considered.
NOTES
 1. This paper is based on a larger research project in Rashed (Forthcoming). Parts of this paper will 
appear in the book.
 2. For accounts of Mad Pride written by activists consult Curtis et al. (2000), Costa (2015), Sen 
(2011), Triest (2012), deBie (2013), and Smiles (2011). See also Asylum Magazine (UK), Spring 2011, 
Mad Pride issue, Volume 18, No. 1. For records, flyers and announcements of past, recent and upcom-
ing Mad Pride events consult the following websites: Hamilton: [http://madpridehamilton.ca/]; Toronto: 
[https://madprideto2015.wordpress.com/]; Liverpool: [http://www.liverpoolmentalhealth.org/mad-pride/]; 
International: [http://www.mindfreedom.org/campaign/madpride/events]. See also: Mad Pride issues of 
the Consumer/Survivor Resource Centre of Canada Bulletin (online: http://www.csinfo.ca/bulletin.php). 
Note that Mad Pride is capitalized to denote a group identity much like Gay Pride, for example. All links 
functional on July 19, 2018.
 3. See DuBrul (2014), and the ICARUS project website, online: https://theicarusproject.net/
mission-vision-principles/
 4. Elsewhere, I have explored, with Rachel Bingham, some of the issues raised by the concept 
of distress in relation to the distinction between “social deviance” and “mental disorder” (Rashed and 
Bingham, 2014).
 5. The term “well-being” is used here in a colloquial, non-technical sense.
 6. See, for example, the UK Equality Act (2010), the US Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).
 7. See Silvers (2010) for a good philosophical overview of the social model of disability.
 8. Note the difference between a person born with a sensory inability—blindness, for example—
and a person who loses sight as an adult. The latter experiences a radical change in functional capacities 
that may be very distressing and disabling and may take some time to adapt to. On the other hand, a 
person born blind may not necessarily experience blindness as a salient obstacle in everyday life. This 
may change, however, if that person wishes, for example, to seek employment or further his or her inde-
pendence. At that point, not being able to see in the context of a physical environment that does not take 
this particular sensory inability into account, may generate disability.
 9. It is possible for a particular state to become salient without resulting in disruption to daily activ-
ity; a twisted ankle may cause pain and discomfort without rendering the sufferer immobile. Similarly, 
one may experience sadness, paranoia, or anxiety without this limiting social interaction or activity. 
However, the discussion in this section concerns disability, and the issue is disruption to activity.
 10. A possible objection to this point is that a person with paraplegia and no recourse to a wheel-
chair may find it very difficult to move from point A to point B. Here, he is clearly thwarted in realizing 
his goal and the obstruction is not a consequence of unaccommodating social arrangements. However, 
disability theorists who endorse the social model for mobility impairments begin their argument by 
assuming the presence of a wheelchair. Disability consists in the limitations faced by the wheelchair user 
in environments with limited stair-free access. Critics could object that you cannot assume the wheelchair 
as it is not part of a human’s natural embodiment. Once you remove the wheelchair, they could argue, the 
extent of non-socially imposed disability becomes evident. A response to this objection is to think of the 
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wheelchair as a tool that improves the functional abilities of persons who cannot walk. If I come across a 
1-ton boulder and find myself unable to push it out of my path, I face a limit to my functional capacities, 
but I do not thus conclude that there is a disorder with my abilities (unless I am Hercules). To move the 
boulder, I make use of tools either to break it down to smaller parts or to somehow push it out of the 
way. Human beings use tools throughout the day to help them compensate for their functional capacities 
and accomplish tasks that otherwise would not be possible. The wheelchair is a tool in this sense, and it 
is acceptable to assume it as a given in arguments concerning the social basis of disability.
 11. Note that the focus here is on the generation of disadvantage (limitation) and not on the factors 
implicated in the genesis of the variation/impairment in the first place, which can include various psy-
chological, biological and social factors.
 12. Unconditional disadvantages are referred to in the disability literature as “impairment effects.” 
These include the discomfort, pain, and inabilities, which disabled people face and are distinguished in 
the literature from the disadvantages experienced as a consequence of social restrictions and discrimin-
ation (Thomas, 2004).
 13. Reference classes are included by Boorse to account for the wide variation of function within 
Homo sapiens: normal function in a newborn would not be the same as an 8-year-old child.
 14. There are many critiques of naturalist accounts of (dys)function; the following are particularly 
helpful: Boorse (2011, 26–37) for a summary of the theories and the objections; Bolton (2008) presents 
a short critique of Boorse’s theory and a substantial analysis and critique of Wakefield’s; Kingma (2013) 
contains an overview of both theories and a general critique of naturalist accounts of disorder.
 15. There have been some recent calls to adopt the discourse of “neurodiversity” as a positive 
replacement for the language of “impairment” (Graby, 2015; see also McWade et al., 2015). Advocates of 
this move believe that this would bring about a positive change: instead of “impairments” we would have 
a diversity of “minority neurotypes” that stand alongside so-called “normal neurotypes” as real and valid 
neurological types. These neurotypes, it is argued, should be accommodated as an element of diversity 
such as race or ethnicity. A major problem with the neurodiversity discourse is that it assumes that exist-
ing categories and identities (e.g., Autism, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Normal, and Mad) 
can be traced back to a shared “neurology.” But, our identifications and categorizations of behavior—as 
is now generally accepted in the domain of mental health—do not “cut nature at the joints” or reflect 
natural discontinuities. If so, then there is not much sense in the claim that there are distinct neurological 
types essentially different from each other. Further, neurodiversity raises a number of difficult questions; 
for example: what exactly is a “normal” neurotype? Do all “normals” share one neurotype? Do all people 
with “autism” share one neurotype? Neurodiversity may be important from an activism point of view, but 
as an argument it does not work.
 16. Not all “deluded” individuals act on their beliefs, a phenomenon known as double bookkeeping 
(see Sass and Pienkos, 2013, 646–50). An oft used example is that of the man locked in an asylum who 
believes he is Napoleon yet does nothing toward exercising his regal powers.
 17. This can change if the person develops primary insight into the delusional nature of the belief; if 
he or she is able to see that it is false, that he is not persecuted and that her husband is not an impostor. 
In such cases the person loses conviction in the belief and is able to see that it really was determining 
behavior in limiting ways.
 18 Making society more tolerant is a solution that tends to be pursued in communities that advance 
notions of free speech and multicultural acceptance. The flip side of this tolerance is for the groups in 
question to develop secondary insight (a point which also applies to the “delusional” person). Secondary 
insight refers to subjects’ abilities to see their beliefs from the point of view of common social values 
and norms, and in doing so to see that others may find those beliefs unusual or bizarre. The benefit of 
secondary insight is that it introduces appreciation of what others’ views are without requiring agreement 
with those views. It allows contrasting beliefs to exist side by side, with both groups remaining aware that 
it will be difficult to reconcile those beliefs with each other. This is to be contrasted with primary insight, 
which as a notion in psychiatric practice refers to the person conceding the falsity of her (delusional) 
beliefs and demonstrating awareness that she is “ill.”
 19. See Heron and Greenberg (2013), Thornicroft et al (2008), Goering (2009), the UK Department 
for Work and Pensions (2009), and the mental health charity Rethink (2012). Of note is that the UK 
Department of Health now recognizes as a disability a mental health condition that lasts more than 
12 months and affects normal day-to-day activity. Among the listed conditions that may lead to disabil-
ity are schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder. By being classified a disability, a mental health 
condition falls under the protection of the Equality Act (2010) and the United Nations Convention on 
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the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). According to these acts, the state is under an obligation to 
provide individuals with disabilities the chance to participate fully in all aspects of life through provision 
of reasonable adjustments that promote access to and engagement with the environment.
 20. This is referred to in the disability literature as psycho-emotional disablism (see Reeves, 2015).
 21. In each of these cases intelligibility means something different. With voices, the issue may be 
that such experiences are completely alien given my worldview. With bizarre delusions, I may be struck 
by how patently false these claims are or fail to understand why this person is holding them. With thought 
disorder, there may be a more basic inability to grasp any meaning at all in what a person is saying. The 
point here, however, is not to parse out the different forms of failure of understanding (see Rashed, 2015), 
or to suggest ways of enlarging intelligibility.
 22. In contrast, mobility and sensory impairments ask us, primarily, to question our embodiment. 
I say primarily because many physical conditions also generate huge stigma— human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV), for example, or leprosy—and hence also implicate the self of patient and other.
 23. It would constitute action failure in so far as it is a negatively evaluated experience of incapacity, 
where incapacity is defined as a failure of intentional action (Jackson and Fulford, 1997, 54). The example 
provided fulfils the two requisite elements for action failure: (1) there is a failure of intentional action 
(the person is unable to make his will effective and not due to an external cause). (2) This incapacity is 
negatively evaluated. (See also Rashed, 2010, 189–90.)
 24. This account is found in a number of works, particularly the work of Giovanni Stanghellini 
(2004).
 25. This account is found in the work of Louis Sass, Joseph Parnas, and others (see Parnas and 
Handest, 2003; Sass, 2003; Sass and Parnas, 2007).
 26. A third approach is to cast doubt on the methodology by which the conclusions of phenomeno-
logical psychopathology are reached (see Rashed, 2015).
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